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According to the Collins English Dictionary 10th Edition fraud can be defined as: "deceit, trickery, sharp practice, or breach of confidence, perpetrated for profit or to gain some unfair or dishonest advantage".[1] In the broadest sense, a fraud is an intentional deception made for personal gain or to damage another individual; the related adjective is fraudulent. The specific legal definition varies by legal jurisdiction. Fraud is a crime, and also a civil law violation. Defrauding people or entities of money or valuables is a common purpose of fraud, but there have also been fraudulent "discoveries", e.g. in science, to gain prestige rather than immediate monetary gain
*As defined in Wikipedia

Wednesday, April 22, 2009

More Goldman Sachs Secrets Revealed -

What is Tim the Tax Cheat Thinking?

Reggie Middleton Releases More Goldman Sachs Secrets that Tim Geithner Might not Share with You!

Okay, this is going to be a quick and dirty review of Goldman's derivative real estate and off balance sheet real estate exposure as is probably reflected through their credit exposure as well.

(See full article link below for embedded chart here)

Now, why would Goldman's OTC Credit Exposure be increasing and deteriorating even as it has taken expensive emergency money from Warren Buffet and strings attached TARP funds it is trying to pass on like a itchy veneral disease? You would think they would be trying to get rid of this stuff versus stuffing the balance sheet with it.

(Another chart of exposure by asset category)

Hmmm! 16% of Goldman's equity is in Alt-A and subprime assets. Alt-a doesn't look to good. Read this article thoroughly, then let's move on - or we can just glance at this chart.

The problem ahead: According to Fitch, of the nearly $200 bn of option ARMs outstanding, roughly $29 bn of loans are expected to recast by 2009. Of this $6.6 bn constitute 2004 vintage (that would be recast as a result of completion of the end of five-year term in 2009) and $23 bn constitute 2005 and 2006 vintage loans that would recast early due to the 110% balance cap limit.

Further an additional $67 bn is expected to recast in 2010 of which $37 bn belong to 2005 vintage (that would be recast as a result of completion of the end of five-year term in 2010) and the balance $30 bn consist of 2006 and 2007 vintage loans that would be recast early due to the 110% balance limit cap. The potential average payment increase on the loans recast is 63%, representing an additional $1,053 due each month on top of the current average payment of $1,672. These large payment increases could cause delinquencies to increase, and increase dramatically, after the recast. The fact that only 65% of borrowers have elected (or are able) to make only minimum payments underscores the magnitude of the potential problem. The potential payment shock combined with the continuous deteriorating outlook for home prices and lack of refinancing opportunities could be a negative cause of concern for investors in Option ARM securities. Even more ominous, is pall cast upon the banks that hold these assets and are additionally exposed to other forms of consumer credit, ie. HELOCs, credit card debt and other unsecured loans (remember the links from the Asset Securitization Crisis above).

Well, let's take a look at the composition of their other exposures...

Go to the full article with charts and graphs - Click Here


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